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ABSTRACT
This article explores the need to recognise and compensate the plurality of
environmental justice claims, while paying close attention to the outcomes
of the most marginalised groups – cultural and ecological – in political
decision-making to avoid vestiges of hegemony. The early history of the
Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (MST) serves as a case
study in which environmental justice claims clash with indigenous rights
claims. In recent decades, the MST has refused settling Amazonian
indigenous territories, consistent with the organisation’s Via Campesina
platform, which focuses on redistributing the 50% of national territory
controlled privately by Brazil’s richest 4%. Yet, in the 1970s and early
1980s, Brazil’s military government pitted landless peasants and
indigenous people’s struggles against each other, circumventing land
reform potentially disruptive to the country’s de facto colonial fazenda
land system. This tactic pressured competing groups – landless peasants
and indigenous people – to ﬁght against each other, concluding
predictably: the most powerful factions ended up getting their way,
conceding less in negotiations than their less-advantageously
positioned, marginalised counterparts. When marginalised groups gain
concessions in environmental justice struggles, often the goods
comprising those concessions come at a cost to marginalised groups
with even less political visibility. Hegemonic structures of power remain
non-negotiable in the process of alleviating other injustices in perceived
zero-sum politics. Such systemic displacement and dispersion of
violence in systems built on violence suggests hegemony aﬀects not just
to other marginalised groups, but to nonhumans too.
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Environmental justice movements are often portrayed as harmonious coalitions allied to surmount
the injustices of a clear opponent (Cole and Foster 2001; Szasz 1994). Such a frame, however,
tends to gloss over real conﬂicts internal to environmental justice movements. I argue that Gramsci’s
description of hegemony goes some way to explain these suppressed inner conﬂicts. Focusing on a
case study examining the birth of Brazil’s landless peasants’ movement, the Movimiento dos Trabal-
hadores Rurais sem Terra (MST) emerged from a territorial clash against indigenous people. This unex-
pected origin of the MST is analysed to describe how hegemonic orders created a division between
these two very diﬀerently motivated groups that became de facto and later de jure premier environ-
mental justice movements in Brazil, and internationally, since the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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Government and corporate pressure on indigenous and peasant groups led to conﬂict and animosity,
with each marginalised group guided to obtain gains at the expense, rather than in support, of the
other. This example of inﬁghting in environmental justice movements – ﬁghting not to be the lowest
rung on the political ladder – emphasises the strategic and ethical necessity for solidarity among dis-
parate environmentally-marginalised groups, to redirect demands for concessions towards the
shared sources of oppression.
The question of inclusion and diﬀerential privilege is at stake in any treatment of environmental
justice; and is especially present for any consideration of the tensions and compromises observed in
pluralising the topic, looking at environmental justice from multiple vantage points without suc-
cumbing to overzealously defending a particular interpretation of events. As the concept has
emerged, environmental justice does not only consider the equitable redistribution of environmental
goods and bads, but also the recognition of lifeways (such as indigenous cultures) embedded in par-
ticular ecologies (Schlosberg 2007). An example of environmental injustice, the fazenda land tenure
system in Brazil betrays its colonial origins, as 46% of the country’s territory is held by the political and
economic elite, who received it historically from colonial landed gentry (Fernandes 2008). To protect
the ruling class’s fazendas and to economically develop the Amazon, a territory continually occupied
by indigenous peoples, the historical Brazilian military government attempted to evade threats to
their territorial power by deﬂecting protesting peasants through sending them on colonisation jour-
neys to the Amazon. These peasants, hungry for land, were often provoked by the Brazilian govern-
ment to occupy indigenous territories.
While according to its Via Campesina platform, the MST has long refused colonisation of the Ama-
zonas, examining how the MST & indigenous people’s struggles were pitted against each other by the
mediating power of the Brazilian government in the 1970s and early 1980s contains valuable lessons
for better dealing with competing environmental justice claims. The complex events surrounding the
founding of the MST exhibit an in-group/out-group approach to land reform rather than solidarity
between peasants and indigenous peoples.
In this particular case of the MST’s founding, degeneration of cultural and ecological dialogue
resulted as both indigenous and peasant groups became ensnared in a logic of zero-sum property
rights based on the fecundity-depleting requirements of “eﬀective use” land policies mandating
land exploitation to secure land tenure. In the transition from the claim to territory based on long-
term habitation and conservation to property rights based on knowledge of how to manipulate exist-
ing political, economic, cultural, and juridical structures imposed on land, those least established in
these structures and hence most vulnerable to their predatory tendencies, suﬀered most. Amongst
the losers of this inscription of land into the state’s bureaucratic social systems was, of course, the
land itself and the multitudinous nonhuman beings dwelling in it.
The theory of hegemony and environmental justice movements
Despite its claims of remedying wrongs inﬂicted upon those groups systematically subjected to
harmful environmental degradation, competing interests in environmental justice often resolve in
ways similar to other issues in politics: the loudest voices with the most power leverage the most con-
cessions, or at least, concede less (and gain more) in negotiations than their less-advantageously
positioned counterparts. The problem of power for marginalised peoples, in other words, is that
even if they successfully achieve political, economic, or territorial goals, often the actual material
goods they receive comes as much at a cost to privileged hegemonic classes as it does from
those groups even further marginalised and less politically visible than the receiving group. This
zero-sum politics immobilises certain existing social structures and relations of power as non-nego-
tiable, even in putatively transformative processes alleviating longstanding injustices. Political recon-
ciliations which perpetuate or even entrench hierarchies despite localised political, economic, or
social gains, signal the quintessence of hegemony – the systemic unidirectional displacement and
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dispersion of violence in a system built on violence (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000; Critchley and
Marchart 2012; Gramsci 1970; Laclau and Mouﬀe 1985).1
Conceptually delineated by Gramsci and elaborated by Laclau and Mouﬀe, the concept of hege-
mony applies to social movements successfully pressing for redistributed power relations when dis-
tribution occurs at the expense of “downstream” people and natural beings rather than at the
expense of resources accumulated “upstream”. Hegemony can be encapsulated through the follow-
ing example: the company boss operating in a competitive atmosphere pressures the manager for
more production; the manager stresses the employee to work harder; the disgruntled employee
goes home and yells at her husband to blow oﬀ steam; the angry husband spanks their child; and
the distressed child delivers this passed-down aggression and kicks the dog. It is not as if any one
person in this chain is solely responsible, or directs this process. While this particular example
appears “top-down”, hegemony is just as often horizontal or diagonal in application. At any point
in the chain, any of the actors have – in theory – the capacity to interrupt the chain of hegemony,
disrupting the perpetuation of systemic violence.
What is striking about the MST, is that in recent history, they are the most successful group to
understand the political explosiveness and eﬀectiveness of “the idea of occupation as critique:
namely, the use of the idea of something being already taken as a rejection of the claims of a hege-
monic power” (Fitzmaurice 2014, 32). Such a power warrants great discernment. When redistributing
land entails petitioners taking commons inhabited by groups with even less access to power, such
transfers do not narrow entrenched power asymmetries as would be the case when occupying
excess land managed by elites; in these cases, instead of challenging preexisting hegemonic struc-
tures, these takings perpetuate them. Hegemony is at play when the extra environmental “goods”
provided to protesting groups come from increased extraction from other realms: the social and eco-
logical peripheries.
Of course, hegemonic structures are perpetuated not just between social groups but within social
movements, as elite management of movements often subordinates some actors (such as women) to
(often male) movement leaders’ exigencies and strategies (DeVore 2016; Suárez 2006). In such cir-
cumstances, we can refer to environmental justice movements that may not necessarily be hegemo-
nic between groups, but within them (Fraser 2003). In other cases perpetuating hegemony in
environmental justice between humans and the environment, concessions won are bought at the
price of further extraction or expropriation from environmental commons (Ostrom 1990, 11 ﬀ). Still
other forms of hegemony, occurring between groups in environmental justice movements, as spot-
lighted in this case of the MST and indigenous Brazilians, intentionally or unintentionally sacriﬁce the
environmental safety and territory of those classes even less politically visible or with less political
purchase, an always unstable position (DeVore 2016; Diomo 1995; Scott 1999). Explored here is
the way elites deﬂect struggles for redistribution, especially for land, away from challenging existing
hegemonic orders and instead set empowered underclasses against disempowered underclasses and
the environment.
Proponents of environmental justice beneﬁt from assiduously attending to land struggles’ pro-
cesses and outcomes to ensure that concessions do not break social or ecological bonds of solidarity,
which might ultimately undermine the overarching campaign for justice. While in recent years neo-
liberalism has garnered the most attention as a framework to analyse and critique actual existing
injustices and their perpetuating mechanisms in environmental justice discourses (Harvey 2006,
2007; Nixon 2011; Vergara-Camus 2014), the frame of hegemony captures internal ways in which
power creates chains of subjugation which predate and undergird the rise of totalising neoliberal fra-
meworks. The reoccurring crises of reconﬁguration of power since colonialism have tended to favour
elite capture for private interests, rather than democratic portioning.
Gramsci’s (1999, 206) insight that “[t]he history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmen-
ted and episodic” serves to critically reﬂect on the MST’s retrospective smoothing of their narrative.
The MST as an organisation has not remained constant but has metamorphosed over decades. They
have gone from a marginalised radical group of peasants physically occupying land to a globally
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ramifying movement routinised within Brazil’s major leftwing Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalha-
dores). Gramsci warns against the “tendency to (at least in provisional stages) uniﬁcation in the his-
torical activity of these groups”, as the messiness of unwritten histories composed into cohesive,
critical narratives “therefore can only be demonstrated when an historical cycle is completed and
this cycle culminates in a success” (1999, 206–207). While the MST is very much still alive as a move-
ment, its routinisation in and cooptation by party politics has substantially shifted its trajectory, even
as it remains revolutionary out of necessity under the Temer interim government. Critically analysing
the MST’s overarching self-description reminds us that subaltern histories are not necessarily more
transparent and self-reﬂexive than dominant ones.
The “integral historian”, as Gramsci (1999, 207) calls her, must therefore be alert to the inertia of
historical narratives perpetuating the obfuscation of injustices internal to even successful social
movements.2 Hegemony’s insidious structure is eﬀective because it inﬁltrates and reproduces struc-
tural violence fractally on increasingly vulnerable populations. While the MST has proved reﬂective in
owning up to moments of reproducing patterns of oppression (Stédile and Fernandes 1999; Vergara-
Camus 2014), it has not been immune to recasting unﬂattering events in more advantageous and
simpliﬁed narratives.
Hegemonic environmental justice: pitting peasants against indigenous rights
Precursors to the MST
Almost nowhere in Brazil did land redistribution historically include indigenous people. Indigenous
peoples became ﬁrst recognised in global international politics during the 1970s and 1980s, as a
result of international actors pressuring states to gesture at respecting indigenous peoples’ unique
rights of land sovereignty, even as many of those same international actors hypocritically refused
to recognise indigenous rights domestically (Merlan 2009; Stocks 2005). Even so, the concessions
landless peasants were able to extract from large-scale landholders occurred under a neocolonial
property regime systematically excluding the commons-type land arrangements indigenous
people possessed.
Brazilian elites’ calculated construction of a rivalry between peasants and indigenous peoples to
deﬂect peasant occupation from their own unproductive large landholdings ( fazendas, known in the
rest of Latin America as latifundios)3 (Branford and Glock 1986), epitomises the abuse of political
power to engineer a hegemonic version of environmental justice. Perfecto, Vandermeer, and
Wright (2009, 111) describe how
one of the chief tactics of the national government to try to forestall the development of a new land reformmove-
ment was to oﬀer land grants in the Amazon. In 1970, Brazil’s President announced that in the Amazon, Brazil
could provide “a land without people for a people without land”. “The land without people” being President
Medici’s quite inaccurate description of the Amazon.
The impact of this displacement of landless peasants onto indigenous peoples’ lands, diverting atten-
tion away from the fallow fazendas originally targeted, had devastating effects on the cultural and
ecological integrity of the Amazonas.
After the 1964 military coup, many Brazilian peasants experienced themselves displaced from the
land they had tended for generations. The sem-terra (without land), as they were called, sought to
organise in a manner separately from the Ligas Camponesas, the rural trade unions in the 1950s
which adhered to strict national trade union political and juridical rules (Branford and Rocha 2002,
23 ﬀ). Formed to combat exploitation from ruling elite landholders, these peasant leagues were
often attacked, their leaders assassinated, and often prohibited from oﬃcially organising altogether.
In a 1976 report, Brazil’s progressive Catholic Church condemned government attacks on rural
workers as widening rather than reducing income gaps (Diomo 1995).
Separately from the peasant leagues, and with strong and often surreptitious support in the late
1960s through the 1980s by many liberation theology Catholic priests, landless peasants slowly
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became organised. A unique, revolutionary form of Catholicism that arose in Latin America in the
1950s and 60’s, liberation theology takes the economic, political, and spiritual liberation of the
oppressed as its mission. Because of the political power of the Catholic Church during these
decades, this religious activist movement became a potent progenitor and ally for social justice
movements throughout Latin America (Poletto and Canuto 2002). Houtzager (2005, 14) notes that
“[t]he Church – as Catholicism as a symbolic order with deep resonance among ‘the people’ – pro-
vided much of the structural and ideational underpinnings of the [MST’s political and juridical]
ﬁeld”, and “also had a strong inﬂuence from the Gramscian left, which may help account for the
strong (and somewhat paradoxical) emphasis on rights”. The MST’s inscription in the prevailing Bra-
zilian legal systems was tense at their inception, and remains ambiguous in some areas.
Land redistribution under Brazil’s military government
The events leading to the MST’s founding are complicated by the organisation’s development from
peasants who were displaced as a result of the Brazilian government’s afterthought to recognise the
territorial rights of indigenous people. Thus, the Brazilian government which had motivated peasants
to Amazonian lands, subsequently forcibly removed the peasants who had squatted these indigen-
ous territories (Branford and Glock 1986).
At the beginning of 1970s, many indigenous groups in Brazil remained “uncontacted” (Branford
and Rocha 2002). Yet, many indigenous tribes had long been inundated during the twentieth
century by migrant rubber tappers. Responding to the pressure of the fazenda system excluding
them from local arable land seized by elites, rubber tapper migrations created pressures on the Ama-
zonian populations in the regions they settled. While Brazil’s rubber tappers’ movement more
recently has been successful in gaining political visibility for their own compromised position
through “merging its claims with environmental and indigenous rights issues” (Johnston and
Almeida 2006, 10), this group draws opportunistically on the political capital of the same victims
their profession historically displaced.
Settler rubber tappers, foresters, and farmers often encountered contrasting imperatives. On the
one hand, they were tacitly encouraged to “colonize” the South American “Heart of Darkness” of the
Brazilian Amazon, making economically legible and mobile previously impenetrable territories
(Zhouri 2010). On the other hand, because often their land holding property rights were tacit and
tentative – an optimistic form of squatters’ rights – industrious entrepreneurial peasant farmers
were at the mercy of the Brazilian government’s national forest industries reclaiming their holdings,
polluting their land through adjacent mining activity, or losing it to private companies or major land-
holders showing up and asserting their absentee ownership on the lands (Branford and Glock 1986;
Branford and Rocha 2002).
Thus, this process of deterritorialising and reterritorialising lands that prima facie were at the dis-
pensation of an elite-controlled federal government, displaced a variety of marginalised groups with
each decision. Such a frustrating situation for both peasants and indigenous peoples vis-à-vis indus-
trial and fazendeiro interests engendered scepticism towards the idea that both groups could receive
the protections and holdings they sought. Missing from these events was a direct confrontation with
the large landholders that made up (and still make up) the majority of land ownership in the country.
The MST, however, would soon ﬁll this gap by turning the question of land acquisition and usage
back on the very entities whose interests governed state decision-making. The MST would present
the case that massive unused parcels of land held by absentee landowners were derelict, and
through this unproductivity, they argued, the owners forfeited their land rights. Hence, peasant
farmers eager to make productive use of these lands had an imperative to do so (Benford and
Snow 2000; Houtzager 2005).
While colonialism had already reduced the 5 million or so indigenous Brazilians to less than
200,000 by the twentieth century (Branford and Glock 1986), the further incursion of rubber
tappers since the 1880s, gold miners during the 1950s–1980s, and unorganised landless peasants
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from the 1960s on, further stripped them of their territories. This forced many tribes onto reservations
or into cities as their traditional lands were usurped and denatured (Branford and Glock 1986). During
the military dictatorship (1964–1985), vast amounts of public land fell into the hands of a few private
conglomerates. In the Brazilian state of Acre, for example, in 1971 75% of the territory was state
owned, while by 1975 80% of the territory had transferred to private corporations (Hecht 1989).
With a quickly diminishing available resource base, both landless peasants and indigenous commu-
nities were vying for the same parcels of a shrinking communal land base.
Indigenous communal territorial rights, when recognised at all, operate under a non-Eurocentric
land ethic diﬃcult to square with private property. When pitted against the quasi-private quasi-col-
lective gray-area of land rights, the MST often ﬁnds its members engaged in, communal land rights
and land rights by occupation have been tricky to amicably reconcile. Indigenous peoples and pea-
sants’ shared plight stems from elite corporate development and transformation of the Amazon and
the industrialisation of extraction of ecological commons. Yet, because such economic forces are for-
midably backed by political power and sanctioned violence, the path of least resistance for landless
peasants and indigenous peoples alike has often been to hold each other accountable for transgres-
sions rather than confronting the architectonic entities driving the scarcity of land (Branford and
Rocha 2002; Wright and Wolford 2003). These conﬂicting rights regimes are based often on contrast-
ing legal models, the MST’s ultimately resting on accepting the prevailing ownership recognition
model of private property rights, while indigenous communities regularly ask for and are granted
claims based on communal territorial rights.
Brazil’s land settlement programme under the Medici government (1970–1974) brought landless
families from northeast Brazil to the Amazon basin under a land colonisation scheme granting plots
in a region the immigrant peasants were poorly prepared for (Jepson 2006). According to Branford
and Rocha (2002, 5), this programme was intended to “guarantee a pool of labour for the ambitious
mining, ranching, farming and logging projects that the military planned in the region”. The peasant
settlers were – unbeknownst to them – instrumentally used to clear the Amazon jungle territories
they were granted. They often encountered the land diﬃcult to work with as they had little local
knowledge of how to work the loamy soils very diﬀerent from the dry northeast. Motivating the pea-
sants to relocate was a necessary sequential step in a corporate plan aimed at getting the peasants to
clear the land before the legal corporate owner of the land drove the peasants oﬀ the now con-
veniently cleared land (Stocks 2005). These manipulative “colonization” projects meant that peasants
were “bullied into travelling to an unknown, hostile region at the other end of the country” (Branford
and Rocha 2002, 6), resulting in a cheap captive labour force of dislocated peasants, searching for
land wherever they could ﬁnd it.
Hegemonic environmental justice and the birth of the MST
If beginnings are telling, the MST’s formal coalescence in reaction to the May 1978 expulsion of
peasant families from the indigenous Kaingang Indian Reserve at Nonoaí, in the region of Rio
Grande do Sul, divulges a deeper schism in indigenous-peasant solidarity than frequently projected
by MST oﬃcial history (Kujawa 2015). The Kaingang tribe had long dealt with illegal settlers on their
lands, peasants who had lost their land to corporations, or who had relocated and then found their
promise of guaranteed land broken. Since the 1940s, settler peasants directed to the Amazon by the
Brazilian government had begun encroaching on Kaingang territory created in 1847 as an oﬃcial
indigenous land claim, the Reserva Indígena do Nonoaí (Fernandes 2000, 50–51). Despite some
success in the 1960s to maintain their territorial lands with the help of government agencies
tasked with protecting indigenous peoples and their interests, many peasants remained on their
lands, and settler peasants kept arriving. Since 1974 the Kaingang had been working with a liberation
theology group, CIMI (Consehlo Indiginista Missionário), to expel the settler families (Fernandes 2000).
In the interim, to cope with a constant stream of peasant immigrants settling on their legally-
appointed lands, the Kaingang set up their own informal (and extra-legal) rentier system, portioning
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out small plots for peasants to farm andminimally log in exchange for monthly payments (Wright and
Wolford 2003). The Kaingangs’ uneasy compromise was brokered, however, without permission from
the sometimes paternalistic National Indian Foundation FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio), which
prohibited the selling or renting of tribal reserve lands to settlers. As deforestation reached alarming
levels, and new waves of peasants began occupying rather than renting reserve lands, planting crops
for commercial purposes and unprecedentedly spraying pesticides, “poisoning local streams and
lakes, killing the ﬁsh and birds”, the Kainang diet and health became compromised (Wright and
Wolford 2003, 16). Upset that peasants circumvented their territorial rights without permission or
payment, and dismayed that their local ecology was quickly deteriorating, the Kaingang reneged
on their existing rentier agreements and demanded that all settler peasants exit their territories
(Wright and Wolford 2003).
When FUNAI was slow act on their behalf to expel the settlers, the Kaingang physically attacked
peasants refusing to leave their territories. This action motivated FUNAI to act as an intermediary, and
in the span of a month, the Kaingang and eventually the Brazilian government deposed 1,800 families
from the reserve, leading to spates of violence between the peasants and the Kaingang (Wright and
Wolford 2003). These bloody events required government intervention to prevent continued vio-
lence between the angry, now homeless peasants, and the Kaingang. This resulted in the govern-
ment eventually bussing half of the displaced peasants to government colonisation projects in
other parts of the Amazon. Not just in Nonoaí, but elsewhere too these land claims clashes
between those serially suﬀering lost land took place (Stédile and Fernandes 1999). Kujawa (2015,
72) notes that the “territorial policies developed by the State, […] paradoxically give […] the same
space, in diﬀerent historic moments, to indigenous peoples and to farmers”. Especially at the colonial
frontier, land claims malleable according to the exigencies of the state, created unnecessary territorial
conﬂicts between indigenous land rights and peasant settlers.
Solidarity is the highest virtue of counter-hegemonic movements. And yet, the dawn of the MST
emerged from a barely averted counter-attack to resettle the Nonoaí reserve. With the help of local
priests and political activists, the enraged displaced peasants only reluctantly turned away from con-
tinued violent confrontation with the Kaingang, on condition of the opportunity to occupy state-
owned and large derelict private landholdings (Wright and Wolford 2003, 18). The MST coalesced
on this new tactic of going after fazendas only after reluctantly deciding against revenge on the
Kaingang.
While peasants traditionally occupied the lowest status in Brazil’s quite rigid class structure, indi-
genous peoples, because they often did not speak Portuguese, were seldom even classed as Brazilian
citizens (Perruci 1999, 167).4 This hierarchy of perceived power and privilege contributed to the enti-
tlement that the socially-enculturated if landless Brazilian peasants could justiﬁably take indigenous
people’s land. The Kaingang, like other indigenous tribes, did not arise from the same colonial form of
property rights shared by the Brazilian state and its linguistic-cultural citizens, but in order to maintain
any claim to their territory they were forced to translate their principles of habitation into legalistic
property terms legible to the state and would-be settlers. It is this instance of the landless peasants,
unjustly forced oﬀ their elite-controlled tenant-farms, unceremoniously settling on Kaingang lands,
that constitutes an act of hegemonic environmental injustice.
The competing claims of both the MST and the Kaingang centred around distributive justice. But
as external forces conﬁned them to struggle against each other for limited territory, their claims
shifted, concentrating on procedural justice. While the landless peasants were already economically
and psychologically inscribed in a system of capital and private property that regarded land as a
resource to extract and sell goods from, their concepts of socio-economic standards and systems
of property became more easily identiﬁable for the state than those of the Kaingang. The conﬂicts
between the landless peasants and the indigenous tribe also revolved around which way of life
receives recognition suﬃcient for the state to intervene to preserve it.
From this clash, the peasants transformed their aims and strategies to achieve their ﬁrst successful
occupation of fazenda land ﬁve years later, having learned (with the support of the priests aiding
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them) that occupying unused estates both attacked the power structures keeping them from land,
and avoided territorial disputes with indigenous peoples. Since receiving the shock of expulsion
from indigenous lands, landless peasants in the interceding decades have on the whole, but not
always, allied with indigenous peoples against their common threats to environmental justice.
Landless peasants as a symptom, not a cause, of indigenous dispossession
While indigenous peoples continue to face encroaching settler peasants, the greatest conﬂicts they
confront involve large-scale production, transnational corporations, and agribusiness (Jepson 2006;
Kujawa 2015). Some of the most egregious human rights violations and takings of indigenous
land in recent decades include soy agribusiness seizing the territory of the Marawatsede in northeast-
ern Mato Grosso, sugarcane agribusiness taking territory from Guarani peoples in Mato Grosso do Sul,
and the Belo Monte dam construction in Pará that has displaced more than 60,000 indigenous
peoples by ﬂooding indigenous territories (DeVore 2016; Jepson 2006; Oliveira 2013; Zhouri 2010).
In these three cases, consistent with its Via Campesina social code, the MST has actively fought for
indigenous territorial rights in solidarity against exploitative state and corporate projects.
Landless peasants and indigenous groups threatened with the removal of their territories are
similar in their calls for justice and basic rights, even if the substance of these claims manifests diﬀer-
ently. The initial post-colonial/neocolonial land distribution scheme of the independent Brazilian
state sowed the seeds for many of the ensuing problems of environmental justice these two
groups face currently. Indigenous claims for sovereignty over their lands and for the survival of
their people and culture clash with the desperation of peasants facing an exploitative capitalist-
feudal economic system ﬁxated on productivity rather than reproductivity (Biesecker and Hoﬀmeister
2010). While migrating populations left other areas principally out of duress, the hegemony of the
land-colonising processes meant that Brazil’s landless peasantry were often led to believe they
had little option but to usurp Amazonian lands from indigenous populations; or, when not directly
taking active territories, it was their encroachment on frontiers (encouraged by the state) that
paved the way (sometimes quite literally) for more organised extractive industries (Branford and
Rocha 2002).
Such path-breaking in the previously impenetrable Amazon and Pantanal also often occurred the
other way around, with extractive industries opening the way for migrant homesteading. The corre-
lation, if not causation, remains clear: where Brazilian nationals entered into territorial spaces pre-
viously occupied only by indigenous peoples (many who may have had no idea that they were in
fact “Brazilian”)5 or uninhabited, untouched (by non-indigenous hands) forest, such “primeval”
forest soon became industrialised, and according to colonial models of use, productive (Hendlin
2014b).
Gold miners or garimpeiros, with ambiguous ties to the MST also invaded native territories and
mined without consent from either local tribes or the government (Hecht and Cockburn 2010,
160). Many small-scale illegal miners and loggers have operated under the cover of the MST, even
as the MST denounces such actions (Wright and Wolford 2003). The major displacements of
tenant farmers starting in the 1960s drove many former farmers “who lost their livelihood [] to
join the gold rush in the Amazon” (Branford and Rocha 2002, 48).
As recent as 2017, “uncontacted” tribes continue to be massacred by garimpeiros encroaching on
their territory to mine for gold (Agence France-Presse 2017). The boundary demarcating who falls in
or out of the MST movement is porous and blurred. The contested boundaries of this movement have
often been taken advantage of by large extractive corporations seeing opportunities in the fragmen-
tation and disagreements internal to the movement (Filho et al. 2015; Gamba and Costa Ribeiro
2017). The vulnerability of those not in positions of leadership or relative power within the MST
raises questions regarding procedural justice and recognition for those marginalised within the
group (Suárez 2006), as well as non-members (such as indigenous tribes) who may be played oﬀ
the MST politically to the detriment of both environmental justice movements.
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Vis-à-vis land grabs, the conversion of terra communis into terra nullius encompasses the
“transfer of ownership, use rights and control over resources that were once publicly or privately
owned – or not even the subject of ownership – from the poor (or everyone including the poor)
into the hands of the powerful” (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012, 238). This clause, “or everyone
including the poor” highlights that communal lands are not owned, properly speaking, under a
private property rights scheme that only valuates land pertaining to particular owners (Hendlin
2014b). Instituting deﬁned property rights for terrains where prior these did not exist, results in
the people living in or around those territories, as well as the area’s natural (nonhuman) inhabitants,
losing their habitat. Generally, land is de facto taken away from such stakeholders, even as de jure,
because the land did not belong to anyone, there can be no rights-holder to take the land away from.
While there are strong arguments that can be made from the environmental point of view for sup-
porting MST land devolution as opposed to continued industrial-level extraction or farming, there is
also the question that in many instances (especially historically), peasants (who might see themselves
as represented by the MST) through encroachment have contributed to indigenous territorial frag-
mentation and diaspora. When the Brazilian government legally recognises the territorial rights of
indigenous peoples, as it has several times, this often involves forcibly removing the peasants that
had homesteaded on indigenous lands. While this helps the indigenous peoples, and ecologists
might reasonably argue preserves a higher level of wilderness, such actions displace serially displaced
peasants, regularly without giving them anywhere else to turn. Such ad hoc policies thus potentially
repeat unjust settlement processes elsewhere, deferring the problem of being a landless farmer to
some more obscure, less surveilled tract of land, where the people who might be inhabiting that
space may be even less politically franchised, ad inﬁnitum. Thus, some landless people have
become landless as a result of delayed state recognition for the legal rights of the longstanding his-
torical territorial inhabitants.
The MST’s uneven evolution
The earlier years of the MST followed the immediate needs of peasants against eviction from their
now strategically occupied fazenda lands, enduring the state and landowner violence that often
accompanied it. In later years, as the group enjoyed substantial victories, MST subunits networked
their short-term regional aspirations with a wider portfolio of social and ecological issues. These
included speciﬁcally allying with forest peoples against expropriating their lands, and demanding
that the government begin to sacriﬁce fazenda territories to meet their land needs – going to the
heart of the colonialist matter – rather than displacing MST environmental justice claims through
encouraging instead occupation of wild and/or indigenous territories (De Souza Martins 1990).
By the early 1980s the MST had distilled its tactics and ethos into a cohesive platform. Since then,
the MST’s principles and tactics have inﬂuenced rural and urban peasant movements around the
world, working in direct action to reappropriate privatised public land for cooperative and communal
small-scale agriculture. Through squatting land unused by fazendas as well as “wild” land often the
home of indigenous people but not yet juridically designated with an oﬃcial private owner, the
MST successfully empowered between 800,000 and 1 million families to legally gain their own farm-
able land, totalling nearly 48 million hectares in Brazil between 1985 and 2006 (Fernandes 2008). The
website they maintain, www.mst.org.br, houses an exhaustive source of information regarding their
movement and its history. Reading it, one gets the distinct impression that the MST is and has been at
the forefront of the environmental justice movement – which is true.
Yet, like all histories, theirs is written through a particular perspective. Even in their continued
struggles, the MST frame their movement as a victorious one. Their substantial, permanent gains
for millions of peasants attest to their role as a ﬂagship environmental justice movement. While
some historians call theirs a minor history, as opposed to the imperial narrative of History written
by the persistently elite-driven Brazilian government,6 it is worth noting that in comparison with
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the majority of Brazil’s indigenous population, the MST’s story and their self-presentation of it reads
nonetheless as written by victors.
The MST’s claims to land were successful in part because despite claims to a revolutionary pro-
gramme of emancipation from the inequalities rife in Brazil, it has managed to work closely with
the country’s unions, parties, clergy, and other power-brokers. One of its most powerful constituen-
cies, the National Rubber Tappers’ Council, has helped the MST in its protests to exert pressure on the
Brazilian government in order to leverage redistributive gains.
While currently the MST is ﬁrm in its commitment to make use of fallow lands already under some
sort of alleged use rather than appropriating virgin rainforest or indigenous areas (Stédile and Fer-
nandes 1999), the political sequences of events that successively pass oﬀ unused or unusable land
on MST members in order to appease their demands often includes the MST as a second-wave
(and sometimes ﬁrst-wave) of rainforest conversion constituency.
The MST’s position as a genuine power the Brazilian state could not ignore, grew out of their “tac-
tically ﬂexible” structure “peopled with managers often as well-versed in revolutionary theory as
would-be revolutionaries” (Maybury-Lewis 1994, 214). Yet still, far from entirely successful, their
movement remained continuously vulnerable to the government’s ability to “co-opt, encapsulate,
or, if necessary, repress them” (Maybury-Lewis 1994, 214). While rooted in revolutionary transforma-
tive politics of Gramscian liberation theology and land occupation (Diomo 1995), the MST quite
clearly has undergone a pragmatic turn as it has enjoyed political success. This has often lead to com-
promises of fulﬁlling speciﬁc member goals rather than holding out for the broader social changes
originally sought. From the beginning, some MST factions have been more concerned with achieving
their own material needs and buttressing their own regional power than sharing their land gains with
others who were not directly involved in their campaigns and struggles. Especially in the early for-
mation of the MST, solidarity as a movement took a secondary role to immediate material gain.
One MST activist wrote in a MST newspaper, later reﬂecting on this period: “The conquest of land
was the central question. The idea was: ‘the day I get my plot of land all my problems are over.’ It
was a struggle for land not for agrarian reform” (CONCRAB 1995, 28).
Those less politically astute and motivated, especially indigenous populations that usually only
fought back defensively rather than proactively, have sometimes been left outside of the negotiated
treaties and pacts between the MST, private corporations, and the government. This is a common fate
for indigenous groups not yet inscribed in and reproducing western hegemonic forms of power
(Schröder 2016).
The reoccurring question of who is the MST, and what tradition they represent is raised by Martins,
who calls the agglomeration that is the MST an “invention of tradition” rather than the result of some
continuous, cohesive and delineable group of peasant workers (De Souza Martins 2002, 300; cf. Hobs-
bawm and Ranger 2012). The identity claims of the MST have not been that they are indigenous
peoples who have had their communal lands lost, but that they are landless peasants that have
been displaced and excluded from the fazenda system which Brazil anomalously in South
America, has not yet abolished. Brazil has not instituted a major land reform overhaul since the post-
colonial system of distributing land to wealthy politically-connected families was carried out in the
nineteenth century.
The question of inclusion comes to a fore in Hecht’s description of the Amazon as historically
inhabited by a “large, complex peasantry formed from indigenous peoples; de-tribalised natives;
runaway slaves; populations left in place after the various booms ebbed; the new colonists from
the massive settlement and agrarian reform programmes, like the trans-Amazon highway; ethnic
settlements like those of the Japanese and Mennonites; and a range of other migrants who followed
the roads, the jobs and resources like gold, timber and coca” (Hecht 2015, 233). Parsing which groups
are more representative of the MST, which less, and which are left out and at times have even been
oppositional, can be diﬃcult due to the porous and dynamic relationships these various groups
sometimes have. This diﬃculty is compounded by the historical shift of the MST from a localised
pro-peasant farmer movement to a more broad collectivist and revolutionary movement committed
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to solidarity with other marginalised rural peoples – indigenous and migrant. As identity politics
began to play a larger role in the MST’s self-understanding and individual members’ identity, norma-
tive ideals of distributive justice have expanded to constrain the MST’s marginalisation of potentially
allied groups.
It remains unclear how the precarious relationship between the MST and indigenous communities
will unfold. On the one hand, Brazil’s latest Forest Code of 2012 forgives many settler peasants who
have appropriated wild Amazonian land that was indigenous territory, thereby permanently reducing
the amount of territory available to indigenous groups and for conservation eﬀorts (Filho et al. 2015).
On the other hand, the Forest Code has been heralded as pragmatic and tractable politics; the
alternative would be confront violent resistance if the government had attempted to commandeer
small landholder properties for indigenous communities or conservation (Gamba and Costa
Ribeiro 2017). In exchange for forgiving illegal encroachment, the Brazilian government is demanding
that small landholder’s preserve up to 80% of their property as wild for ecological integrity, ﬂora and
fauna biodiversity, and carbon accreditation (should that scheme ever become an economic reality)
(Soares-Filho et al. 2014). Thus, in giving up a strong commitment to indigenous land sovereignty and
indigenous rights, as well as in exchange for large-scale ecological preservation, the Brazilian govern-
ment is opting for a matrix ecology approach. Matrix ecology deﬁnitions of healthy ecosystems do
not necessarily exclude productive (commercial) use. Understood as a patchwork of ecological
islands that together form suﬃcient cohesion networks, such policies aim to ﬁt in nature in the inter-
stices of human activity (Perfecto, Vandermeer, and Wright 2009). Whether this environmental justice
gain for peasant farmers is fair for indigenous forest peoples, is another matter.
Discussion
Analysis
In examining the history of Brazil’s MST, especially the earlier years (late 1970s to the mid-1980s)
when the exigencies of winning land concessions often outstripped solidarity with fellow peasants
and indigenous people also facing encroachment, one can discern a decisively less coherent
notion of environmental justice than the image and practices that later emerged (Borsatto and
Carmo 2013; Houtzager 2005; Stédile and Fernandes 1999). Elites played subjugated peoples oﬀ
one another to forward their own interests and undermine signiﬁcant redistribution that would
require their own sacriﬁce. This is a general tactic used far beyond the events surrounding the
birth of the MST (Harvey 2007; Nixon 2011; Vergara-Camus 2014).
On the journey from sem-terra to com-terra, the frente de massa or MST vanguard sent into new
regions of potential land gains often ran into indigenous populations already occupying those
lands in a manner very diﬀerent than the MST families sought to use the land. The illegibility of
indigenous land use – their lack of fences, buildings, or extensive agriculture covering the full
extent of the terrain they frequent for activities such as plant harvesting, ﬁshing, and hunting – to
the Brazilian government and its crusade for defensible land as well as for the MST families
viewing ownership as signalled by distinctive marks of possession derived from colonialism,
constitutes a major aspect of Brazil’s environmental justice quandary (Zhouri 2010). Like many
other places in Africa, Asia, and the Americas (and anywhere where semi-nomadic people dwell),
sedentary agriculturalist practices are quickly becoming the lingua franca of land ownership,
against which other forms of living or convivencia are glossed as deviant, wasteful, and backwards.
The cult of productivity surrounding modern agriculture measures success by crop intensity. This
metric undermines the claims of indigenous people to the vast areas they inhabit. The terra nullius
model of land ownership which became the neoliberal doctrine of “eﬀective use” codiﬁed in the
1988 Brazilian Constitution, works in concept if not in practice equally against the MST as it did
against indigenous communities (Hendlin 2014b). The race against the land, maximising short-
term crop output at the cost of ecological and social health and resilience, can just as well be
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posed as an argument against the small land farming of minifúndios, favouring industrial farming. In
the short-term at least, industrial farming can create pound-per-pound more food than smaller-scale
farms, even if monocropping for export creates less ecological and social resilience than diverse sub-
sistence crop production.
As Oliveira (2013) notes, the Brazilian government has a history of preventing and triaging land
grabs in one part of the country while courting large-scale foreign agribusiness in others. This unrec-
onciled policy dissonance has been consistent across Brazil’s regimes, democratic and dictatorial.
While the military government was more explicitly unresponsive to farmer and indigenous needs,
since democratisation and even under the da Silva and Rousseﬀ PDT governments, agribusiness
interests have overridden indigenous and farmer opposition (Robles and Veltmeyer 2015). Despite
public lip service to indigenous rights and social justice, hegemonic land practices have continued
to advance in Brazil.
The MST and the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, México, comprise the formative global anti-
imperialist movements renegotiating the relationship between governments and underclasses
(Vergara-Camus 2014). These movements’ far-ﬂung inﬂuences on the Occupy Wall Street movement,
Greece’s Direct Democracy Now movement, and Spain’s Indignado movement (Tucker 2014), rec-
ommend critiquing the MST for the sake of environmental justice. The organising practices, multiple
and direct venues in which they stake their claims, internal decision-making processes, and methods
of commanding respect from establishments of power that otherwise would prefer to ignore or
expropriate them, have all upset neoliberal hegemonic modes of power and created spaces of rela-
tive autonomy for collective self-determination. The MST is one of the few groups which – at least to
some degree in certain periods – has managed to successfully control the political frame; elites
cannot aﬀord to dismiss their activities or exclude them wholly from decision-making processes,
for the MST has managed to capture and maintain a moral high ground that has translated into pol-
itical stature and material gains.
The situation for various indigenous groups in Brazil has not been as successful, unfortunately.
Partly because of their lack of a unifying, popular political body, indigenous struggles against territor-
ial dispossession have been checkered: certain internationally-well-connected tribes, such as the
Kayapo have been granted sovereignty over their 22 million hectares (though this remains continu-
ally imperiled), while other tribes, such as the Yasuni (or Xingu), have been displaced, terrorised,
and fragmented in cases where large infrastructure projects have outweighed indigenous rights
(Dowie 2011).
In the past two decades, the MST has prudently broken the unholy pact the Brazilian dictatorial
government wrought, pitting the MST against indigenous people and their commonly held land.
As indigenous rights became a powerful bargaining chip vis-à-vis the international community,
and indigenous land concessions from the government became a major form of land distribution
backed by powerful transnational environmental organisations, the MST gladly partnered with
these powerful interests, obtaining an allied mantle of environmental justice through mutual solidar-
ity between the two oppressed groups.
A heretical thought in environmental justice
The irony that hegemonic structuring seeped into peasant-indigenous relations at the birth of the
MST in Brazil, and in many other instances of pluralist environmental justice struggles, suggests
that active work to decolonise power structures in environmental justice movements is critical
(Tuck, McKenzie, and McCoy 2014). Environmental justice movements, like Standing Rock, would
then become heterarchic and networked rather than hierarchical (Goldberg 2017).
What diﬀerentiates the environmental justice movement from the environmental movement, in
part, is that environmental justice struggles “tended not to be about nature, per se, but about
land use, social impact, [and] human health” (Szasz 1994, 40). It seems a categorical mistake for
either movement to exclude the ecological or human aspects. Yet, to some extent, this has been
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perpetuated in environmental justice movements. This additional layer of hegemony rarely con-
fronted in environmental justice that warrants consideration is ecological justice.
Wright and Wolford (2003, xxi) call “the contrast between laws mandating good land use and large
landowners’ actual, wasteful practices” embodied in Article 184 of the 1988 Constitution “Brazil’s
most profound legal contradiction”. As codiﬁed in the Brazilian Constitution, the obsession with
“using” land is a slippery slope from using up land (Hendlin 2014b). Starting from the unsustainable
premises that land not yoked to commercial use is wasted, precludes any amount of redistribution
from achieving equitable or sustainable outcomes. If unsustainable farming methods are employed
to cope with hegemonic pressures to (over)produce, even hard-fought peasant landholdings will
become quickly insuﬃcient as they are exhausted, aﬄicting future generations (Hendlin 2014a). Bran-
ford and Rocha (2002, 51) note that the 1988 Constitution’s “eﬀective use clause”, requiring that land
fulﬁl its “social function” of income generation or else risk expropriation, marked a weakening of the
military regime’s previous land reform-leaning Land Statute, which “permitted the government to
expropriate latifundios, deﬁned either by size or land use, without any reference to ‘social function’”.
As laudatory as this aim is for fulﬁlling the promise of omnia sunt communia when applied narrowly
and instrumentally to latifundios, Article 184 entrenched an exploitative frame on the purpose of land.
Article 184 failed to understand the ecological and social importance of so-called “unproductive” land
as viewed through the lens of global ﬁnancialisation.
Zero-sum game theory models encourage depletion of earth commons, urging a race against
others to use up and therefore privatise as much of nature as possible before others do. In fact,
even conservation of nature now has entered a justiﬁcatory scheme such that conservation has to
be productive for biodiversity, carbon credits, ecosystem services, or some other abstract material
concept keyed into economic utility (Maier 2017). Norgaard (2015, n.p.) has lamented that “uncritical
economic creed has colonized other disciplines, including ecology, as ecologists increasingly rely on
economistic logic to rationalize the protection of ecosystems”. Even when land and nature is under-
stood as a commons to be collectively managed and enjoyed for current and future generations,
rather than as private land subject to the extractive whims of the owner, any reference to sustaining
the good of the territory and its nonhuman inhabitants is subordinated to the desires and needs of
collectivised human “owners” (Mishori 2014). The recursiveness of ecological justice to the human
subject betrays the possibilities of a non-hegemonic environmental justice.
The compulsion to own land itself and ascribe property to the commons is often overlooked in
postcolonial and indigenous studies focused on land rights. The aim of decolonialisation, it must
be emphasised, is not to transfer “back” to indigenous people the land that colonising powers
took away from them (Tuck, McKenzie, and McCoy 2014). No, the decolonisation movement’s
claim is that land cannot be owned in the ﬁrst place (Tuck and Yang 2012). The movement’s
demand is to disband the property regime that keeps people and land apart and stuck in a
tragedy of the commons-like “game”.
If hegemony is understood as an integrated principle without a convenient beginning or end, then
one might postulate that it starts inside as self-oppression at the top, within the hegemons them-
selves against themselves, and does not end merely with humans, but extends far beyond, exerting
violence onto the more-than-human world (Abram 1996; Biesecker and Hoﬀmeister 2010; Plumwood
2002; Vetlesen 2015).
Conclusion
Pluralism in environmental justice is increasingly receiving the attention it deserves (Schlosberg 1999,
2007). Yet, the political act of solidarity in environmental justice movements remains forever fragile in
the face of bargains with the state or corporations that provide concessions to one marginalised
group at the expense of another. Furthermore, environmental justice groups are never just
groups, but complex compositions of individual actors in which hegemonic structures are often
reproduced, borrowing and lending agency, often without explicit consent. Precisely because the
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MST has proven to be a deeply reﬂective movement capable of solidarity with indigenous peoples
exerting sovereignty over their native territories, as well as willing to confront sexism and other
forms of bias within its own movement, it has met not only political success, but also worldwide
admiration and support. That the MST arose out of a conﬂict in which the Brazilian dictatorship
drove landless peasants to encroach on the territorial rights of an indigenous group, demonstrates
that hegemonic structures are as fragile as solidarity. Yet, for the MST, as with other environmental
justice movements working within colonial property rights regimes even as they work against
them, the hard work of recognising and undoing the ramifying ways hegemony continues to play
out within human groups and their relations with the land remains unﬁnished.
Notes
1. Also see Cox (1993). Laclau and Mouﬀe (1985) rightly note that in regarding and utilising the concept, hegemony
is “not the majestic unfolding of an identity by the response to a crisis”, but instead is inherent to the existing
structure of power relations (7). In the case described here, one could imagine that the response described
arose from the crisis of reconﬁguring power after the end of historical colonialism (see Deutsch 1999).
2. The propensity for alternative structures to reproduce internally the violence hegemonic social structures impose
externally is the very crux, ironically, of critiques of multiculturalism, cultures that exist separately but not outside
dominant, hegemonic culture (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000; Okin 1998; Parekh 2002).
3. The fazenda (or hacienda in Spanish-speaking Latin America) system is a remnant of the colonial latifundio land
apportionment in Brazil and the rest of Latin America. However, every country in Latin America, with the excep-
tion of Brazil, has since independence subsequently undergone land reform. See Stédile and Fernandes (1999), for
evidence that the MST emerged to disintegrate the fazenda system.
4. In “Chile, Argentina, [the] western United States and Canada, and non-coastal Brazil – new national stories served
largely to justify and settle outline maps. They ﬁlled in the blank ‘unoccupied’ spaces with ‘nationals’ or at least
demonstrated possession in some visible way” (Stephanson et al. 2009, 6). Grappling to legitimate politically one’s
own identity group as the truly national(ist) one is not a new event, but is continuous with the long history of
colonialism.
5. See Dennett’s very strange treatment of this topic in Dennett (2002, 2). He writes: “It was still possible in the 1960s
for a human being to live in a nation, and be subject to its laws, without the slightest knowledge of that fact”.
6. Even as Brazil has experienced social democratic governments like that of Lula, the recent hostile take-over of the
Rousseﬀ presidency by what appear to be parties favouring the same constellations of power as Brazil’s historical
military dictatorship, demonstrates that the plutocratic colonial Brazilian fazendeiro power structure has evolved,
while still rejecting restorative justice measures such as agricultural reform.
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